Wittgenstein, Scepticism and Naturalism

Central to any interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is an understanding of his philosophical method and the nature of the turn which characterises the evolution from his early to his later work. In the essays in Wittgenstein, Scepticism and Naturalism , Marie McGinn argues that this methodological shift has at its heart a highly distinctive form of naturalism, which has its roots in the works of Goethe. This form of naturalism emphasises achieving a clarified view of complex, natural phenomena in their natural setting, with a view to describing patterns and connections that are in plain view. Wittgenstein is seen as applying these methods to the task of conceptual clarification, whose aim is to dissolve philosophical problems and paradoxes. The essays cover the following topics: scepticism about the external world; scepticism about other minds; knowledge and belief; meaning and rule-following; psychological states and the distinctive first-person use of psychological concepts; the relation between the early and the later philosophy; and the nature of Wittgenstein’s naturalism.

Central to any interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy is an understanding of his philosophical method and the nature of the turn which characterises the evolution from his early to his later work. In the essays in Wittgenstein, Scepticism and Naturalism , Marie McGinn argues that this methodological shift has at its heart a highly distinctive form of naturalism, which has its roots in the works of Goethe. This form of naturalism emphasises achieving a clarified view of complex, natural phenomena in their natural setting, with a view to describing patterns and connections that are in plain view. Wittgenstein is seen as applying these methods to the task of conceptual clarification, whose aim is to dissolve philosophical problems and paradoxes. The essays cover the following topics: scepticism about the external world; scepticism about other minds; knowledge and belief; meaning and rule-following; psychological states and the distinctive first-person use of psychological concepts; the relation between the early and the later philosophy; and the nature of Wittgenstein’s naturalism.