Making a Career in Dictatorship

Who loyally carries out the most brutal violence for a dictator? And who overthrows the very leader they swore to protect? Like no other work before it, Making a Career in Dictatorship dives deep into the authoritarian security apparatus to identify which officers participate in repression or coups--and above all, why. The book's compelling theory uncovers career pressure as the secret driver behind the two most notorious phenomena of authoritarian power politics. Officers disadvantaged in their professional advancement either try to demonstrate their loyalty to the current regime by participating in repression, or to commend themselves to a successor regime by participating in a coup. The book offers a wealth of unprecedented evidence in support of its unified theory. Based on unique career data on thousands of Argentine army officers, in-depth case studies on Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union, and Jawara's Gambia, and a global analysis of authoritarian regimes since 1945, a striking pattern emerges: career pressure fuels extreme behavior. By revealing for the first time the organizational structure, promotion systems, and career paths within the authoritarian security apparatus, the book shows how seemingly banal career concerns shape the bottom-up dynamics of regime survival and collapse. In times of rising authoritarianism, this book offers key insights into how states and societies fall victim to illiberal leaders and their willing enforcers.

Who loyally carries out the most brutal violence for a dictator? And who overthrows the very leader they swore to protect? Like no other work before it, Making a Career in Dictatorship dives deep into the authoritarian security apparatus to identify which officers participate in repression or coups--and above all, why. The book's compelling theory uncovers career pressure as the secret driver behind the two most notorious phenomena of authoritarian power politics. Officers disadvantaged in their professional advancement either try to demonstrate their loyalty to the current regime by participating in repression, or to commend themselves to a successor regime by participating in a coup. The book offers a wealth of unprecedented evidence in support of its unified theory. Based on unique career data on thousands of Argentine army officers, in-depth case studies on Hitler's Germany, Stalin's Soviet Union, and Jawara's Gambia, and a global analysis of authoritarian regimes since 1945, a striking pattern emerges: career pressure fuels extreme behavior. By revealing for the first time the organizational structure, promotion systems, and career paths within the authoritarian security apparatus, the book shows how seemingly banal career concerns shape the bottom-up dynamics of regime survival and collapse. In times of rising authoritarianism, this book offers key insights into how states and societies fall victim to illiberal leaders and their willing enforcers.