Choosing Well

Self-defeating behavior and the damage it can cause constitute a rich and intriguing area of philosophical inquiry. Choosing Well explores the challenges associated with effective choice over time from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Andreou focuses on the challenges raised by cyclic preferences and incomplete preferences, both of which interfere with our ability to neatly order our options and thus make us susceptible to self-defeating patterns of choice which in turn create unacceptable results. What are we to do if we find ourselves with cyclic preferences or with incomplete preferences? Do such preferences make us irrational? Andreou argues that rationality does not invariably prohibit disorderly preferences but does prompt us to proceed with caution when preferences are disorderly. Theories of rational choice often dismiss or abstract away from the sorts of disorderly preferences that Andreou focuses on, since they assume that rational agents can and should have neat preferences over their options. Instead, Andreou suggests, rationality can validate certain disorderly preference structures while also protecting us from self-defeating patterns of choice.

Self-defeating behavior and the damage it can cause constitute a rich and intriguing area of philosophical inquiry. Choosing Well explores the challenges associated with effective choice over time from both theoretical and practical perspectives. Andreou focuses on the challenges raised by cyclic preferences and incomplete preferences, both of which interfere with our ability to neatly order our options and thus make us susceptible to self-defeating patterns of choice which in turn create unacceptable results. What are we to do if we find ourselves with cyclic preferences or with incomplete preferences? Do such preferences make us irrational? Andreou argues that rationality does not invariably prohibit disorderly preferences but does prompt us to proceed with caution when preferences are disorderly. Theories of rational choice often dismiss or abstract away from the sorts of disorderly preferences that Andreou focuses on, since they assume that rational agents can and should have neat preferences over their options. Instead, Andreou suggests, rationality can validate certain disorderly preference structures while also protecting us from self-defeating patterns of choice.